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THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE
By C. PERRY PATTERSON*
O NE OF THE most controversial provisions of the Constitu-
tion is the general welfare clause. The debate over the mean-
ing of this clause began in Washington's first administration be-
tween Hamilton and Jefferson in connection with the establishment
of the first bank of the United States. It has continued through
our history, being the subject of frequent pronouncements by states-
men and of comment by learned publicists. In general the discus-
sion followed partisan lines which were represented by the doc-
trines of loose and strict construction. The supreme court man-
aged to dodge this issue down to 1936 when it placed its first in-
terpretation on this clause in the case of Butler v. United States.'
The loose construction theory has generally been designated
Hamiltonian and the strict construction theory Jeffersonian, some-
times the Jefferson-Madison theory, because- the popular under-
standing is that Madison in 1830 after he had become a Jeffersonian
made an interpretation of the clause in agreement with Jefferson.
The truth of this matter is that Madison in 1788 in The Federalist
made the same interpretation of the general welfare clause as he
made in 1830 before he had changed his politics and before the Con-
stitution had been adopted. Jefferson followed Madison in both
time and substance in his interpretation. In order, however, to
judge of the constitutionality of these two widely divergent in-
terpretations it is necessary to see how this clause got into the
Constitution and for what purpose it was adopted.
*Professor of Government, University of Texas.
1 (1936) 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477, 102 A. L. R. 914.
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The First Appearance of the Clause
In Artcile III of the Articles of Confederation is found the fol-
lowing language: "The said states hereby severally enter into a
firm league of friendship with each other, for their comnon de-
fense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general
welfare. . . ." Here the language could mean nothing more than
a general purpose of the league and conferred no power whatever
on the league. The article further speaks of "binding themselves
to assist each other." In other words, whatever action might be
taken would be a matter of the individual states. For the same gen-
eral purpose the clause is repeated in the Preamble of the Consti-
tution of the United States which has never been considered as
conferring powers on the government of the United States. 2 How-
ever, the clause was inserted in the Constitution as is later shown
before it was placed in the Preamble.
The Clause in the Federal Convention
All of the leading statesmen of the transition period from the
Articles of Confederation to the Constitution realized that the
chief weakness of the general government under the Articles was
its lack of power to lay and collect taxes because governments can-
not functioni without money. Accordingly all of the four proposals
for the new Constitution3 suggested that the power to levy and col-
lect taxes be granted to Congress. On August the 16th, almost three
months after the meeting of the Federal Convention, in accordance
with the recommendation of the Committee of Detail, the con-
vention adopted without dissent the first power of the Congress:
"The Legislature of the United States shall have the power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imports and excises."
4
This power would undoubtedly have remained in this form but
for the solicitation of some delegates about the payment of the
revolutionary war debt. On August the 18th, Rutledge and Charles
Pinckney of South Carolina and Gerry and King of Massachusetts
called attention of the convention to the fact that no specific pro-
vision had been made for the payment ot the debt of the confedera-
tion and Pinckney moved that Congress have power "to secure the
2W. W. Willoughby, The- Constitutional Law of the United States,
(1929) i, 97.
sThese were the Madison, Paterson, Pinckney and Hamilton proposals.
4Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention, (1911) I, 308.
While no state delegation' -dissented, Mr. Gerry of Massachusetts voted
against the resolution.
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payment of the public debt."5 This motion was referred to the
Committee of Detail.
Then Rutledge moved that a grand committee consisting of one
member from each state be appointed to "consider the necessity
and expediency of the United States assuming all the state debts.
... The assumption would be just as the state debts were contracted
in the common defense."6 Rutledge stated in support of his motion
that, as taxes on imports were to be given up by the states, "It was
politic, as by disburdening the people of state debts it would con-
ciliate them to the plan." 7 King said, "Besides the considerations of
justice and policy which had been mentioned, it might be remarked
that the state creditors, an active and formidable party, would other-
wise be opposed to a plan which transferred to the Union the best
resources of the States without transferring the state debts af the
same time. The state creditors had generally been the strongest
foes of the impost plan.""
It is necessary to notice that here were two objects of special
taxation-the debt of the confederation and the state debts-which
it was felt that the regular provision of taxation already adopted
would not include. It was not clear that the government under the
Constitution would be obligated to pay the debt of the confederation
and it was certain that it was under no obligation to pay the state
debts and could not do so without special provision. It is also im-
portant to notice that if provisions should be made to use the taxing
power for these two purposes that when they were accomplished the
special power would cease to have any force because there was no
suggestion by any member of the convention that the government
under the Constitution would not have the power to pay its own
debts. It was specifically being given "the power to borrow money
on the credit of the United States," or to create debts, and certainly
the power to pay such debts would be implied.
On August the 21st, three days after the appointment of the
special committee on state debts, it reported through Governor
Livingston of New Jersey, recommending the following new power
for the Congress: "The Legislature of the United States shall
have power to fulfill the engagements which have been entered into
rIbid., II, 325, 326.GIbid., II, 327. This motion was referred to a grand committee con-
sisting of Langdon, King, Sherman, Livingston, Clymer, Dickinson, Mc-
Henry, Mason, Williamson, C. C. Pinckney, and Baldwin. The italics in the
quotations are supplied unless the contrary is indicated.
71bid., II, 327.8lbid., II, 327, 328.
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by Congress, and to discharge as well the debts of the United States,
as the debts incurred by the several states during the late war, for
the cosnnwn defense and the general welfare."'
Tiis was the first time the phrase "for the common defense and
general welfare" was used in the convention in connection with any
specific provision, of the Constitution. The report was debated on
Atgust the 22nd, Madison taking the position that the power should
be, granted "to prevent misconstruction" and Gerry thinking it
"essential that some explicit provision should be made... so that
no pretext might remain for getting rid of the public engage-
ments." 1 The feeling against a possible repudiation of the debt
of the Congress became so strong that Gouverneur Morris moved to
substitute the following motion: "The Legislature shall discharge
th debts and fulfill the engagements of the United States'." This
motion was adopted unanimously. On August the 23rd the con-
vention prefixed this clause to the taxing power previously adopted,
making the revised provision read as follows 1 "The Legislature
shall fulfill the engagements and discharge the debts of the United
States and shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, im-
posts and excises.""
Th'troublesome problem of the debts of the confederation kept
recurring. Mason of Virginia contended that "the .use of the word
shall 'will beget speculation and increase the pestilent practice of
t.,st6ckgr bbing," arid said that there was "a great distinction between
6oigihii creditors and those who purchased fraudulently of the ig-
iorant and distressed." Butler of South Carolina objected to shall
because it "would compel payment as well to the bloodsuckers who
had speculated on the distresses of others, as to those who had
fought and bled for their country.'1 2 Finally on motion by Ran-
dolph of Virginia the word shall was eliminated and the clause
covering the debts of the confederation was changed to: "All debts
contracted and engagements entered into, by or under the authority
of Congress shall be as valid against the United States under this
Constitutionas under the Confederation.""3 This change left the
Congress'under the Constitution free to deal with these debts as it
saw fit. 'It was'not compulsory to pay 'them in full. It could dis-
criminate between original purchases and those who had bought
9Ibid.;.l, 352.
"0Ibid. II; 377.
"Ilbid., II, 382...
"Ibid., 11, 392.13Ibid., II, 414.
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bonds at sacrificial prices. The advantage that the creditors had won
was that under the Constitution the Congress by virtue of its tax-
ing power would be able to pay these debts at whatever figure it
might decide. . I
It was still felt, however, that the taxing clause needed adjust-
ment to make clear that the Congress could levy a tax for the pur-
pose of paying the old debts. In fact, the Committee of Detail had
on August the 22nd, 'suggested the phrase "for payment of the
debts and necessary expenses of the United States." According-
ly on August 25th, Sherman of Connecticut said that he "thought
it necessary to connect with the clause for laying taxes, duties, etc.,
an express provision for the object of the old debts," and moved to
add to the power "to levy and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
excises" the words "for the payment of said debts and for the de-
fraying of expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense
and general welfare." 14 This motion was defeated, indicating that
the convention thought that Congress would have the power to pay
the old debts as well as current expenses without any change in the
taxing clause.
It seems that this action might have ended the matter but for
the question of the aisumption of the state debts which had been
suggested in Governor Livingston's report on August 21. This
matter had been separated from the question of the debts of the,
Confederation and no action had been taken on it. On August the
31st the question of the assumption of the state debts was referred
to a committee of eleven headed by Judge Brearley of New Jersey.
This committee in its report on September 4 ignored the matter of
state debts, but suggested the same change in the taxing clause
which Sherman had proposed on August 25, and which the conven-
tion had defeated, still feeling that it would require an express
pov er to enable Congress to pay the old debts and to provide for the
common defense, and the general welfare. Accordingly, it moved
that the taxing clause should read: "The Legislature shall have
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the
debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of
the United States."''1 This change was approved by the convention
without dissent. It is clear that the phrase "to pay the debts" re-
ferred exclusively to the debts of the Confederation because the
Congress, of course, would have power to pay the debts which it
14Ibid., II, 414.15Ibid., 11, 497.
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contracted. It was also clear that this change did not increase the
taxing power but only enlarged the purpose for which taxes could
be used, namely the old debts. The power to pay these debts was
made an express power rather than leaving the power to be doubt-
fully implied.
Why were the additional words "and provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States," added? Here
it is necessary to recall that the Committee of Eleven to which was
referred the matter of state debts made the following report on
August 21 through Governor Livingston. "The Legislature of the
United States shall have power to fulfill the engagements which
have been entered into by Congress, and to discharge as well the
debts of the United Siates, as the debts incurred by the several
States during the late war, for the common defense and general
welfare."16 This phrase, it is seen, is only descriptive of the debts
for which taxes could be levied-debts both those of the old Congress
and of the states that luad been incurred "for the common defense
and general welfare." It not only did not grant any power what-
ever but limited the use of taxes to the achievement of such wel-
fare as is provided in the subsequent powers which the Committee
of Detail on August 6 suggested should embrace those matters of
common defense and general welfare over which the government
of the United States should have control and about which it should
have the power of legislation. "In other words," as Charles War-
ren, the greatest of our constitutional historians says, "the phrase
'to provide for the general welfare' is merely a general description
of the amount of welfare which was to be accomplished by carrying
out those ennumerated and limited powers vested in Congress-
and no others." 7 In other words, it conferred no power whatsoever
on the Congress, which was exactly the Madison and Jefferson con-
tention as will later be shown.
Interpretation by Madison
For almost a half century down to his death in 1836, Madison
was the only member of the convention, or American statesman for
that matter, who knew what the members of the convention said in
the debates on the genieral welfare clause.' Charles A. Beard re-
cently stated that Madison's "belated interpretation of the general
welfare clause" as not conferring any power whatsoever upon the
3-Ibid., II, 356.
17The Making of the Constitution, (1937) 475. Italics supplied.
IsMadison's Journal'was not published until 1840.
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Congress was not made until "after he became a partisan,"'19 imply-
ing that he changed his mind after he became a Jeffersonian or that
he had said nothing before and merely agreed with Jefferson for
partisan reasons. This statement does not square with the record.
Madison repeatedly explained the meaning of this clause, in
1788, 1791, 1799, 1817, and in 1830, and these explanations are in
agreement. Madison was the first American to explain the meaning
of the clause because it was one of the objections made against the
adoption of the Constitution. In the Federalist No. XLI published
in 1788 he said: "Some, who have not denied the necessity of the
power of taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against the
Constitution, on the language in which it is defined. It has been
urged and echoed, that the power 'to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States,' amounts to an
unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged
to be- necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No
stronger proof could be given of the .distress under which these
writers labor for objections, then their stooping to such a miscon-
struction.
"Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of Con-
gress been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions
just cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color
for it; though it would have been difficult to find a reason for so
awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate in all
possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom of the press, the
trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the form
of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the terms
'to raise money for the general welfare.'
"But what color can the objection have, when a specification of
the objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows,
and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? If the'
different parts of the same instrument ought to be so expounded as
to give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one part of the
same sentence be excluded altogether from a share in the meaning;
and shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their
full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any
signification whatsoever? For what purpose could the enumeration
of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant
to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more
19The Republic, (1943) 110.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
natural nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to
explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of
an enumeratioii of particulars which neither explain nor qualify
the general meaning and can have no other effect than to confound
and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the
dilemma of charging either on the authors of the objection or on
the authors of the Constitution, we must take the liberty of suppos-
ing, hadnot its origin with the latter.
"The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it appears
that the language used by the convention is a copy from the articles
of confederation. The objects of the Union among the States as
described in article third, are 'their common defense, security of
their liberties, and mutual and general welfare.' The terms of
article eighth are still more identical: 'All charges of war and all
other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or
general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress, shall
be defrayed out of a common treasury,' etc. A similar language
again occurs in article ninth. Construe either of these articles by
the rules which would justify the construction put on the new Con-
stitution, and they vest in the existing Congress a power to legislate
in all cases whatsoever. But what would have been thought of that
assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general expressions, and
disregarding the specifications which ascertain and limit their im-
port, they had exercised an unlimited power of providing for the
common defense and general welfare? I appeal to the objectors
themselves, whether they would in that case have employed the
same reasoning in justification of Congress as they now make use of
against the convention. How difficult it is for error to escape its
own condemnation.
20
It will be noticed that the critics of the Constitution in 1788,
hoping to defeat its ratification, charged that the general welfare
clause gave to the national government an "unlimited commission"
to legislate for the general welfare. Madison speaks of the "distress"
of these critics and of "their stooping to such misconstruction."
"But what color can the objections have," he says, "when a speci-
fication of the objects alluded to by these general terms immediately
follow, and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semi-
colon." In other words Madison says that the matters covered by
"the common defense and general welfare clauses" are to be found
in the "specification of powers that immediately follows-the
20The Federalist (by Edmond Gaylord Bourne, 2 Vols., 1901) I, 282-284.
Italics supplied.
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enumerated powers. According to Madison these clauses are only
descriptive of the powers that follow and add absolutely nothing to
the powers of Congress. This means that whatever power Congress
has to tax "for the common defense and the general welfare" must
be found in the enumerated powers. "For what purpose," he says,
"could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these
and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general
powers ?" This is exactly -what the minutes of the convention show
to have been the purpose of these clauses as has beenpreviously
shown. It is exactly what Charles Warren says was their purpose.
This explanation of these clauses by Madison was in 1788 be-
fore the rise of political parties under the Washington administra-
tion and before they became involved in Hamilton's financial
policies. Jefferson was not even in the country. It is true that Madi-
son later changed his politics, but he never changed his views on
the Constitution. The fact is he had to change his politics to keep
from changing his constitutional principles.
Three years later in 1791 when the establishment of the Bank of
the United States was being debated by Congress, Madison, then
a member of the House of Representatives, laid down the rules
which should govern the interpretation of the Constitution as
follows:
"An interpretation that destroys the very characteristics of
government cannot be just."
"Where a meaning is clear, the consequences, whatevei they
may be, are to be admitted; where doubtful, it is fairly triable by
its consequences."
"In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the instru-
ment, if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a proper guide."
"Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable
evidence of the meaning of the parties." ,
"In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only
the degree of its incidentality to an express authority is to be re-
garded, but the degree of its importance also; since on this will
depend the probability or improbability of its being .left to con-
struction."
"Reviewing the Constitution," he said, "with an eye to these
positions, it was not possible to discover in it the power to -incorpo-
rate a bank. The only clauses under which such a -power could be
pretended, are either:
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1. The power to lay and collect taxes to pay the debts, and
provide for the common defense and general welfare."
21
* "In discussing this power," he said, "no .argument could be
drawn from the terms 'common defense, and general welfare.' The
power as to these general purposes was limited to acts laying taxes
for them; and the general purposes themselves were limited and ex-
plained by the particular enumeration subjoined. To understand
these terms in any sense, that would justify the power in question,
would give to Congress an unlimited power; would render negatory
the enumeration of particular powers; would supercede all the
powers reserved to the state governments. These terms are copied
from the Articles of Confederation; had it ever been pretended,
that they were to be understood otherwise than here explained ?""
It is clear from this quotation that Madison is repeating almost
verbatim the explanation of the general welfare clause made in
the Federalist. The sum total of his explanation is that it was purely
descriptive of the ehumerated powers that followed. It was a case
of laying down a general thesis and later supporting it with details
defining its scope.
In 1799 Madison again reaffirmed his original interpretation in
the Federalist. Speaking of the use of the words "for common de-
fense and general welfare" in the Articles of Confederation and in
the Constitution, it was never supposed, he said, "that the mean-
ing was changed" and that "it will scarcely be said that in the former
they were ever understood to be either a general grant of power, or
to authorize the requisition or application of money of the old Con-
gress to the common, defense and general welfare, except in the
cases afterwards enumerated, which explained and limited their
meaning: and if such was the limited meaning attached to these
phrases in the very instrument revised and remodeled by the present
Constitution, it can never be supposed that when copied into the
Constitution a different meaning ought to be attached to them.123
"In both," he said, "the Congress is authorized to provide
money for the common defense and general welfare. In both, is
subjoined to this authority an enumeration of the cases to which
their powers shall extend. Money cannot be applied to the general
21The other powers listed which are irrelevant to this discussion are:
"2. The power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, and 3. The
power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution those
powers."22Annals of Congress, 1st Congress, 3rd Session, February 2, 1791, p. 1946.
See also Benton's Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, I, 275.23Writings (Hunt Ed.) VI, 354, 355.
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welfare, otherwise than by an application of it to some particular
measure conducive to the general welfare. Whenever, therefore,
money has been raised by the general authority, and is to be applied
to a particular, a question arises whether the particular be within
the enumerated authorities vested in Congress. If it be, the money
requisite for it may be applied to it; if it be not, no such application
can be made.
-2 4
It is noticed that Madison repeats in substance his previous
interpretations of the general welfare, holding that it was only a
general description of the subsequent enumeration of powers prac-
tically all of which relate to the common defense and general
welfare and that when money is appropriated for these purposes
the constitutionality of the act must be found in a "particular"
power, otherwise the entire subsequent enumeration of powers
which was the object of the greatest solicitude of the convention,
which determines the chief characteristic of the government-that
of a limited government-and without which the Constitution
would have been impossible, becomes meaningless.
In 1817 as President of the United States in a veto message of
a bill providing for internal improvements he said: "To refer the
power in question to the clause 'to provide for the common defense
and general welfare' would be contrary to the established and con-
sistent rules of interpretation, as rendering the special and carefid
enumeration of powers which follow the clause nugatory and im-
proper. Such a view of the Constitution would have the effect of
giving to Congress a general power of legislation instead of the
defined and limited one hitherto understood to belong to them,
the terms 'common defense and general welfare' embracing every
object and act within the purview of a legislative trust. It would
have the effect of subjecting both the Congress and laws of the
several states in all cases not specifically exempted to be super-
seded by laws of Congress, it being expressly declared 'that the Con-
stitution of the United States and laws made in pursuance thereof
shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any
state to the contrary notwithstanding.' Such a view of the Con-
stitution, finally, would have the effect of excluding the judicial
authority of the United States from its participation in guarding
the boundary between the legislative powers of the General and the
State Governments, inasmuch as questions relating to the general
241bid., VI, 357.
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welfare, being qiuestions of policy and expedience, are wnsus-
ceptible of judicial cognizance and decision."25
Here again the same interpretation is restated with additional
emphasis, that to grant the Hamiltonian construction would be
tantamount to nullifying all of the enumerated powers, to the estab-
lishment of Congressional supremacy, and, therefore, to the elimi-
nation of judicial review as an enforcing agency of the "boundary
between the powers of the General and State governments." He
warned the American people against the far-reaching effect of the
doctrine of implication, calling attention to a fundamental distinc-
tion that has not been sufficiently recognized "between a power
necessary and proper for the Govennment or Union, and a power
necessary and proper for executing the enumerated powers. In the
latter case, the powers included in each of the enumerated powers
were not expressed, but to be drawn from the nature of each. In
the former, the powers composing the Government were expressly
enumerated. This constituted the peculiar nature of the Govern-
ment. No power, therefore; not enumerated could be inferred from
the general nattire of the Government. Had the power of making
treaties, for example, been omitted, however necessary it might
have been, the defect could only have been lamented, or supplied
by an amendment of the Constitution."26
"The doctrine of implication is always a tender one. The danger
of it has been felt in other governments. The delicacy was felt in
the adoption of our own; the danger may also be felt if we do not
keep close to our chartered anthorities."27
Speaking of the arguments to sustain the bank bill, he said: "If
implicatiofis, thus remote and thus multiplied, can be linked to-
gether, a chain may be formed that will reach every object of legis-
lation, every object within the whole compass of political econ-
omy."28 The prophesy in these statements has just about been ful-
filled. Judicial review has just about abolished itself as a check upon
the Congress by "remote and multiplied implications."
In 1830, only six years before his death, Madison in a famous
letter to Andrew Stevenson, November 27, said: "It is to be em-
phatically remarked that, in the multitude of motions, propositions,
and amendments, there is not a single one having reference to the
terms 'common defense and general welfare,' unless we were so to
25James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents; (1903)
I, 584, 585.
26Annals of the Congress, 1st Congress, 3rd Session, 1950.
27Benton, op. cit., I, 276.28Annals of the Congress, 1st Congress, 3rd Session, 1949.
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understand the proposition containing them made on August 25th,
which was disagreed to by all the states except one. The obvious
conclusion to which we are brought is that these terms, copied from
the Articles of Confederation, 29 were regarded in the new, as in the
old instrument, merely as general terms, explahed and limited by
the subjoined specifications, and, therefore, requiring no critical
attention ...
... That the terms in question were not suspected in the con-
vention which formed the Constitution of any such meaning as has
been constructively applied to them, nmay be pronounced with entire
confidence; for it exceeds the possibility of belief that the well
known advocates in the convention for a jealous and cautious defi-
nition of federal powers, should have silently permitted the intro-
duction of words or phrases in a sense rendering fruitless the re-
strictions and endless definitions elaborated by them." 30 Madison
also called attention to the fact that the ratifying conventions pro-
posed 126 amendments to the Constitution and in no instance was
the general welfare clause mentioned; yet all of these amendments
sought to place further limitations on Congress." Again, he says:
"A like demonstration, that these terms were not understood in any
sense that could invest Congress with powers not otherwise be-
stowed by the Constitutional charter, may be found in what passed
in the first session of the first Congress, when the subject of
amendments was taken up, with the conciliatory view of freeing the
Constitution from the objections which had been made to the ex-
tent of its powers or the unguarded terms employed in describing
them. Not only were the terms 'common defense and general wel-
fare' unnoticed in the outset; but the Journals of Congress show
that, in the progress of the discussions, not a single proposition was
made in either branch of the Legislature which referred to the
phrase as admitting a constructive enlargement of the granted
powers, and requiring an amendment guarding against it. Such a
forbearance and silence on such an occasion, and among so many
members who belonged to the part of the nation which called for
explanatory and restrictive amendments, and who had been elected
2 It has frequently been stated by historians, legal writers, and statesmen
that the phrase "for the common defense and general welfare" was copied
from the Preamble. Just the opposite was true. They were borrowed from the
Articles of Confederation, September 3; incorporated in the taxing clause
September 4; and placed in the Preamble September 12. See Charles War-
ren, The Making of the Constitution, page 475, footnote 1. See also Madison's
Journal on these dates.
3OWritings (Hunt Ed.) IX, 420. Italics suplied.
alIbid., IX, 422.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
as known advocates for them, cannot be accounted for without sup-
posing that the terms 'common defense and general welfare' were
not at that time deemed susceptible of any such construction as has
been applied to them.
32
What then were Madison's arguments? (1) That the general
welfare clause was copied from the Articles of Confederation where
it conferred no power because the old Congress could neither tax
nor legislate, and, therefore, was merely the assertion of a general
purpose. (2) That its meaning was found in the powers subjoined
to the Articles as well as in the Constitution. (3) That the natural
and logical method of presenting an issue is to state a general thesis
and support it with details. (4) That this is the method used in
the Constitution is shown by Congress being given the power to
declare war, but, without trusting the means to implication, it is spe-
cifically given the power to raise and maintain armies and navies
and to provide rules and regulations for their government-that it
is given the power .to coin money and regulate the value thereof
dnd to punish counterfeiters as the means of enforcing its power,
et cetera. (5) That the clause never attracted the attention of the
state rights critics in the convention that framed the Constitution,
or in the ratifying conventions, or in the Congress that proposed the
Bill of Rights or in the legislatures which ratified it. (6) That it is
inconceivable that a clause which would create congressional
supremacy could escape the notice of as many able critics as these
various bodies contained when many of them had been elected for
the specific purpose of guarding the rights of the states. (7) That
it was generally understood 'that the general government was a
limited one, that/ this is its chief characteristic, and that to admit
the construction that is sought would create an unlimited govern-
ment. (8) That this construction would destroy the line between
the general and the state governments and, therefore, destroy the
chief function of the Federal Courts, and that this alone was
enough to prove its unconstitutionality. (9) That if this construc-
tion was admitted, the Constitution might as well be "thrown into
the fire," because constitutional supremacy would be succeeded by
congressional supremacy and ultimately by a unitary state. To
Madison's logical mind it was unthinkable that one principle of the
Constitution could destroy another and itself at the same time. He
never thought that judicial review which was included to preserve
the supremacy of the Constitution and, therefore, its lines dividing
authority would finally be the agent of its destruction. Is Constitu-
32Ibid., IX, 422, 423.
GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE
tional government impossible? If not what is the device for its
maintenance?
Jeff erson's Interpretation
It has already been shown that Madison placed his interpreta-
tion on the general welfare clause before the Constitution was
adopted and before there was any conference between him and
Jefferson about it, Jefferson being in Paris at the time, and that
Madison never changed his original construction of this clause. It
follows, therefore, that Jefferson never changed Madison's mind
on this matter. Did Madison determine Jefferson's construction of
the clause? It is not possible to give a categorical answer to this
question but it is very unlikely that either influenced the other in
this matter, the two statesmen being what they were. It came as a
shock to both of them that any one could contend that this clause
conferred a separate and substantive power on the Congress which
alone would have made it an unlimited government. It cannot be
doubted in the least that Jefferson, if he had had the least suspicion
that the clause was unsusceptible of such a construction, would have
proposed to make an amendment limiting its meaning when the
Bill of Rights was being considered.
Because some writers regard Madison's construction of the
clause as a strict construction, and because Jefferson is regarded as
the father of the doctrine of strict construction, they conclude that
Jefferson determined Madison's point of view. In this case the
sequence of events made this impossible. However, it does not seem
to occur to these commentators that a true and accurate construc-
tion of the Constitution is not a strict construction.. Because one
insists on a proper construction of the Constitution he is not ipso
facto a strict constructionist or even a Jeffersonian. This is just the
kind of philosophy that has made it an indication of senility or
moronity even to raise the question of constitutionality about any
of the acts of government in this country and has substituted the
demands of the ballot box for constitutional government.
In Jefferson's opinion to President Washington on the consti-
tutionality of the Bank of the United States in 1791 he said: "To
lay taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United States,
that is to say, to lay taxes for the purpose of providing for the
general welfare. For the laying of taxes is the power and the
general welfare the purpose for which the power is to be exercised.
They are not to lay taxes ad libitum for any purpose they please;
but only to pay the debts or provide for the welfare of the Union.
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In like manner, they are not to do anything they please to provide
for the general welfare, but only -to lay taxes for that purpose. To
consider the latter phrase, not as describing the purpose of the first,
but as giving a distinct and independent power -to do any act they
please, which might be'for the good of the Union, would render
all the preceding and subsequent enumerations of power com-
pletely useless. It would reduce the whole instrument to a single
phrase, that of instituting a Congress with powers to do whatever
would be for the good of the United States; and as they would be
sole judges of the good or evil, it would be also a power to do
whatever evil they please. It is an established rule of construction
where a phrase will bear either of two ieanings, to give it that
which will allow some Mieaning to thIe other parts of the instru-
ment, and not that which would -render all the others useless. Cer-
tainly no such universal power was meant to be given them. It was
intended to lace them up strictly within the enumerated powers,
and those without which, as means, these powers could not be
carried into effict.
'33
In 1792, referring to the general welfare clause, he said: "I sup-
pose the meaning of this clause to be, that Congress may collect
taxes for the purpose of providing for the general welfare, in those
cases wherein the Constitution empowers them to act for the general
welfare. To suppose that it was meant to give them a distinct sub-
stantive power, to do any act which might tend- to the general
welfare, is to render all the enumerations useless, and to make their
powers unlimited.
3 4
In the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, Jefferson said: "Words
meant by the instrument (the Constitution) to be subsidiary only to
the execution of limited powers, ought not to be so construed as
themselves to give unlimited powers, nor as a part to be taken as to
destroy the whole residue of that instrument."3 5 Here a very solid
distinction is made between a power which is purely incidental to
the execution of a granted power and a power of government which
is not granted but which is derived from even an incidental power
which is itself derived by implication. In other words, when inci-
dental powers which *are derived fror granted powers as a means
for their execution are themselves Made into substantive powers of
government by construction, violence is done to the Constitution
3 sWritings (Ford Ed.) V, 286. Italics supplied.
84Ibid., VI, 141. Italics supplied.
35Ibid., VII, 299.
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and to the principle of a limited government. Granted powers are
conferred upon the government not by the people but by judicial
construction.
In 1815 in a letter to Spencor Roane he said: "I hope our courts
will never countenance the sweeping pretensions which have been
set up under the words 'common defense and general welfare.'
These words only express the motives which induced the conven-
tion to give to the ordinary legislature certain specified powers
which they enumerate, and which they thought might be trusted
to the ordinary legislature, and not to give them the unspecified also;
or why any specification? They could not be so awkward in
language as to mean, as we say, 'all and some.' And should this
construction prevail, all linits to the Federal Government are done
away. This opinion, formed on the first use of the question, I have
never seen reason to change, whether in or out of power; but, on
the contrary, find it strengthened and confirmed by five and twenty
years of additional reflection and experience; and any countenance
given to it by any regular organ of the government, I should con-
sider more ominous than anything which has yet happened." 36
In 1817 in a letter to Albert Gallatin, speaking of an act for in-
ternal improvements which had been vetoed by President Madison,
Jefferson said: "The act was founded, on the principle that that
phrase in the constitution which authorizes 'to lay taxes, to pay
the debts and provide for the general welfare,' was an extension of
the powers specifically enumerated to whatever would promote the
general welfare; and this, you know was the federal doctrine,
whereas, our tenet ever was, and indeed, it is almost the only land-
mark which now divides the federalists from the republicans, that
Congress had not unlimited powers to provide for the general
welfare, but were restrained to those specifically enumerated; and
that as it was never meant they should provide for that welfare but
by the exercise of the enumerated powers, so it could not have been
mieant they should raise money for purposes which the enumeration
did not place under their action; consequently, that the specification
of powers is a limitation of the purposes for which they may raise
money.... This phrase . . . by a mere grammatical quibble, has
countenanced the General Government in a claim of universal
power. For in the phrase, 'to lay taxes, to pay the debts and provide
for the general welfare,' it is a mere question of syntax, whether the
two last infinitives are governed by the first or are distinct and
36Writings (Library Ed.) XIV, 350, 351......
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coordinate powers: a question unequivocally decided by the exact
definition of powers immediately following.Y
3 7
What then by means of summary were Jefferson's arguments?
(1) That Congress is limited to levying taxes for the general wel-
fare. (2) That the general welfare involved is that which is in-
cluded in the enumerated powers which control the purposes for
which taxes can be levied. (3) That if this is not true, the general
welfare clause creates an unlimited government and makes useless
the enumerated powers. Why grant "all" and "some"? (4) The
established rule of construction is to give to the equivocal parts of
a document a meaning that harmonizes with the rest of it. (5) That
it is generally true that no government has a right to do anything
that is not for the general welfare and particularly is this true of a
general government in a federal system where local matters are
under the, control of independent governments. (6) Hence, it is
true that all the powers of the general government relate to "the
common defense and general welfare," and, therefore, constitute
the objects for which taxes can be levied. The -war powers are for
"the common defense," and the powers to regulate commerce, to
coin money and regulate its value, to make uniform rules for the
regulation of bankruptcy, to make treaties, and to maintain the
supremacy of the 'Constitution and laws of the United States
throughout the land are for "the general welfare." (7) Even its
forbidden powers kept it from giving preferences to sections in
violation of "the general welfare."
Hamilton's Interpretation
The constitutionality of Hamilton's commercial policies was
questioned by Madison and Jefferson. Hamilton contended that the
power of Congress to lay and collect taxes "for the common defense
and general welfare" was limited only by (1) uniformity for in-
direct taxes; (2) apportionment for direct taxes and (3) the pro-
hibition of taxes on exports. "These three qualifications excepted,"
he said, "the power to raise money is plenary and indefinite, and the
objects to which it may be appropriated are no less comprehensive
than the payment of the public debts, and the providing for the
common defense and general welfare. The terms 'general welfare'
were doubtless intended to signify more than was expressed or im-
ported in those which preceded; otherwise, numerous exigencies
incident to the affairs of a nation would have been left without a
37Works (Ford Ed.) X, 91.
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provision. The phrase is as comprehensive as any that could have
been used, because it was not fit that the constitutional authority of
the Union to appropriate its revenues should have been restricted
within narrower limits than the 'general welfare,' and because this
necessarily embraces a vast variety of particulars, which are suscep-
tible neither of specification nor of definition."
"It is, therefore, of necessity," he said, "left to the discretion of
the national Legislature to pronounce upon the objects which con-
cern the general welfare, and for which, under that description, an
appropriation of money is requisite and proper.'.'
"The only qualification of the generality of the phrase in ques-
tion, which seems to be admissible, is this," he said: "That the ob-
ject to which an appropriation of money is to be made be general,
and not local; its operation extending in fact or by possibility
throughout the Union, and not being confined to a particular
spot.' '3s
The scope of "the general welfare," according to Hamilton in-
cludes "a vast variety of particulars, which are susceptible neither
of specification nor of definition," and are "of necessity left to the
discretion" of Congress, subject only to the limitation that the ob-
ject "be general, and not local." Within this field which cannot be
defined the power of Congress to raise and appropriate revenues "is
plenary and undefinite." Here, according to Hamilton, is a distinct
and separate grant of an indefinite power subject only to the dis-
cretion of Congress as long as the objects of its solicitude are not
"confined to a particular spot." It is clear that this is a: grant of
congressional supremacy adequate for the purposes of a general
government, free from the limitation of judicial review and elimi-
nating the necessity for the subsequent enumeration of powers.
Monroe's Interpretation
Monroe in his first annual message to Congress December 2,
1817, speaking of the importance of good roads and canals, said:
"A difference of opinion has existed from the first formation of
our Constitution to the present time among our most enlightened
and virtuous citizens respecting the right of Congress to establish
such a system of improvement. Taking into view the trust with
which I am now honored, it would be improper after what has
passed that this discussion should be revived with an uncertainty
of my opinion respecting the right. Disregarding early impressions
38Works (Lodge Ed.) Vol. 3, 371, 372.
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I -have bestowed on the subject all the deliberation which its great
importance and a just sense of my duty required, the result is a
settled conviction in my part that Congress does not possess the
right. It is not contained in any of the specified powers granted to
Congress, nor can I consider it incidental to or a necessary means,
viewed on the most liberal scale, for carrying into effect any of the
powers which are specifically granted."' 9
The result was that Monroe asked the Congress to submit an
amendment to the states, giving it the power to raise and to spend
money for internal, improvements and stating that "In cases of
doubtful construction, especially of such vital "interests,' it con-
ports with the nature and origin of our institutions, and will con-,
tribute much to preserve them, to apply to our constituents for an
explicit grant of power." The amendment was introduced in the
Congress, but was defeated, by those who were opposed to such an
extension of federal power and by others who felt that Congress
already had the power.40 Monroe finally reached the conclusion
that Congress could appropriate money for internal improvements
but could not engage in their actual construction without encroach-
ing upon the police power of the states.
Story's Interpretation
Story agreed in part with the Madison-Jefferson construction.
"Do the words," he asked, "'to lay and collect taxes, duties, im-
posts, and excises,' constitute a distinct, substantial power; and the
words, 'to pay debts and provide for the common defense-and gen-
eral welfare of the United States,' constitute another distinct and
substantial power? Or are the latter words connected with the
former, so as to constitute a qualification upon them? If the former
be the true interpretation," he said, "then it is obvious, that under
color of the generality of the words 'to provide- for the common
defense and general welfare,' the government of the United States
is, in reality, a government of general and unlimited powers, not-
withstanding the subsequent enumeration of specified powers: if
the latter be the true construction, then the power of taxation only
is given by the clause, and it is limited to objects of a national
character, 'for the common defense and the general welfare.' "41
It will be noticed that Story's interpretation is a middle ground.
30Richardson, op. cit., II, 18.40Homer C. Hackett, Constitutional History of the United States (1939)
I, 350-352.
41Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, (1833) II,367.
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He agrees with Madison who appointed him to the Supreme Court
that the welfare clause does not make a separate grant of sub-
stantive power to the Congress but restricts the taxing power to
objects that must meet the requirements of the general welfare.
He differs from Hamilton in this respect, but he differs from Madi-
son in that he thinks that Congress can name the objects which are
included in "the common defense and the general welfare" while
Madison contended that these objects had to be found in the enu-
merated powers of Congress.
It is obvious that there is a tremendous difference in the scope
of the authority of Congress according to these interpretations. The
Story interpretation though not as broad as that of Hamilton or
of James Wilson creates an almost unlimited subject matter for
legislation by the Congress provided it is connected with taxation.
After all, are not all the functions of government based on taxation?
"Judge Story's construction," says Charles Warren, "has, in
fact, resulted in vesting Congress with a power practically uw-
limited in its scope. The construction, moreover, produces an ano-
malous result, viz., that though Congress has no power to create,
construct, or administer a specific instrumentality unless the power
be granted in the Constitution, it may, nevertheless, appropriate
money raised by taxation to maintain such an instrumentality if it
deems the same to be for the general welfare. In other words, that
while Congress may have no constitutional power to create a uni-
versity in every state, it may have the power to appropriate money
to run them, if, in its opinion for the.general welfare. '42
It is unfortunate that Hamilton and Story did not have access to
the Madison Journal which was not published until 1840. It is true
that Hamilton was a member of the Federal Convention, but he
never spent much time at the convention due to the radical differ-
ence between his views and those of his colleagues, Lansing and
Yates, which divided the delegation and lost the state its vote. In
fact, they all left the convention. Story never saw the minutes of the
convention, which are an indispensable source from which to ap-
proach the study of any part of the Constitution. Story was a real
student, and it is almost certain that if he had had access to this
great source he would have reached the same conclusion as that
reached by Charles Warren.
The result of recent historical research by Charles Warren and
critical examination of the minutes of the Federal Convention and
42Warren, op. cit., 477, 478.
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of the records of the state ratifying conventions is that: (1) The
phrase "to pay the debts" was inserted in the Constitution for the
sole and express purpose of enabling the Congress to pay the debts
of the confederation which a provision of the Constitution had
brought forward and made as binding on the new Congress as on
the old Congress. There was no suggestion from any source that
the Congress under the Constitution would be unable to pay its
own debts because it was given the specific power to borrow money
on the credit of the United States, from which the power to pay
such debts would logically follow. (2) The phrase "for the common
defense and general welfare" was copied from the Articles of Con-
federation where it had been purely descriptive of the powers of the
old Congress and where it conferred no power whatever. This was
exactly the contention of Madison and Jefferson. Madison knew
from'his records that this was what the convention intended. Since
it has been shown in this paper that Madison made this interpreta-
tion in No. XLI of The Federalist in 1788 before the Constitution
was ratified and before Jefferson returned from France, it follows
that Jefferson either reached the same conclusion independently or
borrowed his interpretation from Madison.
Story was wrong in two particulars according to Madison,
Jefferson, Warren, and the minutes of the Federal Convention: (1)
That to pay the debts referred to the debts contracted under the
Constitution and (2) That Congress could determine the meaning
of the phrase "for the common defense and general welfare" instead
of its meaning being found in the subsequent enumerated powers.
It must be remembered that Madison and Jefferson did not con-
tend that Congress could not tax "for the common defense and
general welfare." This would, according to them, prevent Congress
from exercising ariy of its powers. Their contention was that all
the powers of Congress are "for common defense and general wel-
fare," but that its powers are enumerated and that the enumeration
defines the scope of the welfare clause otherwise the government is
unlimited except by its own discretion. As Jefferson said why grant
"all" power by the welfare clause and then grant only "some"
powers by enumeration?
It is interesting to reflect on what Justice Story thought about
Hamilton's interpretation of the general welfare clause and then
on what the Supreme Court has done to Justice Story's interpre-
tation. "If the clause, 'to pay the debts and provide for the common
defense and the general welfare of the United States,' is construed
to be an independent and substantive grant of power," he said, "it
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not only renders wholly unimportant and unnecessary the sub-
sequent enumeration of specific powers; but it plainly extends far
beyond them, and creates a general authority in Congress to pass all
laws, which they may deem for the common defense and general
welfare. Under such circmnstances, the Constitution would prac-
tically create an unlimited national government."43 He agreed with
Madison and Jefferson in this contention. He further agreed that
"The enumerated powers would tend to embarrassment and con-
fusion; since they would only give rise to doubts, as to the true
extent of the general power, or of the enumerated powers.
44
Madison thought that this tautology and conflict was enough to
prove that the Hamilton interpretation was unconstitutional, be-
cause it was impossible to eliminate the enumerated powers. Justice
Story strengthened this argument, saying: "One of the most com-
mon maxims of interpretation is ... that, as an exception strength-
ens the force of a law in cases not excepted, so enumeration
weakens it in cases not enzonerated."45
Justice Story thought he was placing a very restrictive inter-
pretation on the power in question when he limited it merely to
taxation. In other words, Congress could only tax for the general
welfare: it could not legislate in general for the general welfare.
He overlooked the fact that only legislation raising and appropriat-
ing money would likely do much for the general welfare and that
as a matter of fact practically all legislation involves the expen-
diture of money.
For more than 150 years the Supreme Court was able to escape
placing an interpretation on the general welfare clause. In 1936 it
adopted Story's interpretation, but incorrectly stated that "Mr.
Justice Story, in his Commentaries, espouses the Hamiltonian posi-
tion."' It has been shown previously by a quotation from Hamilton
that he insisted that the welfare clauses made a distinct and sub-
stantive grant of power to Congress while Story maintained that it
was only a purpose clause and restrictive of the taxing power. One
wonders if the court did not know the difference and also which one
it meant to adopt. In two later cases Justice Cardozo elaborated the
court's philosophy as to the general welfare clause; both opinions
dealt with social security. In the first, only a passing remark was
made to the effect: "It is too late today for the argument to be
43Story, op. cit., II, 369.
44Ibid., II, 369, 370.
45Ibid., II, 370.4GUnited States v. Butler, (1936) 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed.
477, 102 A. L. R. 914.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
heard with toler~ince that in a crisis so extreme the use of money of
the nation to relieve the unemployed and their dependents is a use
for any purpose narrower than the promotion of the general wel-
fare. '47 This remark was made in concluding a discussion in which
an attempt was being made to draw a line between duress and in-
ducement as if it would make any difference as to the constitution-
ality of what was being done whether by duress or inducement, of
the states. It seems that the court conceded that if the states were
being coerced, the scheme of things was unconstitutional but if only
inducement was, being used the same scheme of things would be
constitutional. Can Congress by .mere legislation, if the states
consent by inducement, change the Constitution? Of course, Con-
gress nationalized the administration of the participation of the
states in the scheme of things. It is very doubtful whether either
Hamilton or Story ever imagined tlat the welfare clause could
control state taxation and abolish state administration of its own
taxes.48 The significant thing about the remark is not only its lack
of relation to the point under consideration, but the flat announce-
ment that it was "too late" to listen to argument on constitutionality
"in a crisis so extreme." In other words, what is necessary is con-
stitutional.
In the second decision by Justice Cardozo congressional su-
premacy as predicted by Madison, Jefferson, Monroe, and Story
was practically announced. "The line must still be drawn," said the
court, "between one welfare and another, between particular and
general. Where this shall be placed cannot be known through a
formula in advance of the event. There is a middle ground or cer-
tainly a penumbra in which discretion is at large. The discretion,
however, is not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to
Congress unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary
power, not an exercise of judgment. This is now familiar law. '4 9
"When such a contention, comes here we naturally require a show-
ing that by no reasonable possibility can the challenged legislation
fall within the wide range of discretion permitted the Congress. ' ' 0
This is but an involved way of saying that Congress is prac-
4TSteward Machine Co. v. Davis, (1937) 301 U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 883,
81 L. Ed. 1279, 109 A. L. R. 1293.48See dissenting opinion of Justice Sutherland in the Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis Case, in which Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and Butler
concurred.49Helvering v. Davis, (1937) 301 U. S. 619, 57 S. Ct., 904, 81 L. Ed. 1307,
109 A. L. R. 1319.9
°United States v. Butler, (1936) 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct., 312, 80 L. Ed.
477, 102 A. L. R. 914.
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tically unlimited in legislating for the general welfare. A line must
be drawn between particular and general welfare, but by what
body? By the Congress, not by the courts. Can the courts question
the constitutionality of the line? Not unless the line is clearly wrong
and is outside of "the wide range of discretion permitted the Con-
gress." Even when the wide discretion of Congress is questioned ii
must be shown that "by no reasonable possibility" could the Con-
gress be right. What is the place left to judicial review? This line
must be one of those invisible radiations of which Justice Holmes
so frequently spoke.
Thus has come to pass what James Madison said in 1817: "Such
a view of the Constitution, finally, would have the effect of exclud-
ing the judicial authority of the United States from its participation
in guarding the boundary between the legislative powers of the
General and State Governments, in as much as questions relating to
the general welfare, being questions of policy and expediency, are
unsusceptible of judicial cognizance and decision."5" So it has hap-
pened that by judicial interpretation we have practically abolished
the lines of federalism fixed in the Constitution by the enumerated
powers and achieved the original Virginia proposal that Congress
should have the power "to legislate in all cases to which the separate
states are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States
may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.". 2 While
the Virginia proposal gave Congress the power to regulate all such
state legislation, this remains almost the only function of judicial
review if the states continue to struggle. Justice Holmes once said:
"I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost
our power to declare an act of Congress void. I do think the union
would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the
laws of the several states."5 3 Maybe he was correct. It remains to be
seen. For decades political scientists have contended that the Eng-
lish character offered a greater protection than a fundamental law.
Current events seem to cast some doubt on this contention. It .can
be said now that the future of constitutional government in this
country is primarily in the hands of the Congress subject only to the
ballot box.
5
'Richardson, op. cit., 1, 585.
5-Farrand, op. cit., I, 21.
53Speeches, (1913) 98.
